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Abstract—Secure communications is becoming increasingly
relevant in the development of space technology. Well established
cryptographic technology is already in place and is expected
to continue to be so. On the other hand, information theoret-
ical security emerges as a post-quantum versatile candidate to
complement overall security strength. In order to prove such
potential, performance analysis methods are needed that consider
realistic legitimate and eavesdropper system assumptions and
non-asymptotic coding lengths.
In this paper we propose the design of secure radio frequency
(RF) satellite links with realistic system assumptions. Our contri-
bution is three-fold. First, we propose a wiretap channel model
for the finite-length regime. The model includes an stochastic
wiretap encoding method using existing practical linear error
correcting codes and hash codes. Secrecy is provided with privacy
amplification, for which the finite-length secrecy metric is given
that upper bounds semantic secrecy. Second, we derive a novel RF
(broadcast) satellite wiretap channel model that parameterizes
the stochastic degraded channel around the legitimate channel,
a necessary condition to enable secure communication. Finally,
we show the design of a secure satellite physical layer and
finite-length performance evaluation. In doing so, we define
as sacrifice rate the fixed fraction of the overall coding rate
budget for reliability that needs to be allocated to secrecy. Our
methodology does not make use of channel side information of
the eavesdropper, only assumes worst case system assumptions.
We illustrate our proposed design method with numerical results
using practical error correcting codes in current standards of
satellite communication.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, space links, wiretap
coding, finite-length regime
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
INTEREST in ensuring a desired level of security in com-munication over space links has been steadily increasing
in the last years. Widely used protocols of the Consultative
Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) Packet TM/TC
protocol family already includes basic authentication, encryp-
tion and authenticated encryption [1][2][3]. These solutions
are mainly available at the link layer and mostly targeting
protection of the telemetry and/or telecommand links for
current space missions security architectures. These usually
have simple topologies consisting of a single spacecraft and
a ground segment connected to multiple ground stations, a
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command and control centre and a Payload Data Ground
Segment (PDGS) [4]. End-to-end techniques can therefore
extend the data protection to the entire flow of user data. On
the other hand, advanced network architectures are currently
under study and will possibly include networked or federated
satellites. This increase in complexity requires that the security
architecture and corresponding security protocols must evolve
accordingly. Further, technological advances are also under
development at physical and system levels. For example,
upcoming software-defined radio and networking paradigms as
well as adaptive physical layer mechanisms will surely modify
the operational assumptions of security mechanisms. Finally,
security threads and types of attacks are ever evolving calling
for stronger and complementary security solutions that could
be jointly operative.
Within such context, physical layer security based on
information theoretical security and cryptographic methods
emerges as a post-quantum versatile candidate to complement
overall system security strength. In order to prove such poten-
tial, performance analysis methods are needed that consider
realistic legitimate and eavesdropper system assumptions. In
the following, we review the state of the art in the area and
outline our contributions.
B. Related Results
Practical techniques for physical layer cryptography can be
roughly classified into three categories according to where
they are implemented in the physical layer transmission chain:
at channel, signal and coding level. Techniques at channel
level use the shared random channel for distilling keys (which
can be used by traditional cryptography). At signal level,
these techniques alter the modulation process and may require
modifications in the design of transmitter and receiver. Finally,
techniques at coding level are based on code design methods
that differ from classic code design and are modulation and
hardware independent.
For the terrestrial wireless channel, earliest studies [11] [12]
proposed the use of the reciprocity property of the wireless
channel in the different transmission domains of time, space
and frequency for secret key generation. With the advent of
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) antennas, the same
ideas were tested for wireless MIMO systems for secret
cryptographic key agreement [13] and secrecy capacity [14],
[15], [16], [17], [31]. These works usually rely on perfect CSI
of the eavesdropper’s channel. The role of radio frequency
(RF) channel fading for the different techniques has been well
studied [19], [20], [21], [22]. In [23] it is proved that, in
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principle, any average secure communication rate below the
average secrecy capacity of the fading channel is achievable.
In [24] a masking signal in the modulation was proposed
to obfuscate the eavesdropper when demodulating the analog
signal. However, the noise-like nature of the masking signal in-
duces a large dynamic range that reduces its applicability. The
use of error-control coding has also been widely investigated.
Code design based on coset coding as first proposed in [6][8]
aims at achieving several goals simultaneously: to maximize
Bob’s correct decoding probability and information rate and
minimize information leaked towards Eve. A large body of
constructions and results exist from information theoretical
perspective [25], [26] and from lattice algebraic perspective
[28][29][30][31].
For the satellite wireless channel, the potential of physi-
cal layer security has been less investigated. Physical layer
security in satellite systems has been traditionally based on
spread spectrum, i.e. at modulation ("waveform") level. LPI
and LPD waveforms [32][33][34] along with signal process-
ing and channel coding techniques [35] are highly effective
against jamming attacks and interception. Early studies of
information-theoretic physical layer security focused on multi-
beam satellite communications. In [36] joint power and an-
tenna weights optimization at beamforming level is proposed
to meet individual secrecy rate constraints. Beamforming
weights are obtained from zero forcing constraints on co-
channel interference among legitimate users and eavesdrop-
pers. Subsequent follow up works [37][38] derive optimal
beamforming weights under different system-level assump-
tions such network coding protocols. In these works, secrecy
rate is the secrecy performance metric. Also at modulation
level but differently to weight optimization, [39] introduces
an improved masking signal method with low computation
complexity and reduced dynamic signal range. Assuming the
eavesdropper has perfect knowledge of modulation scheme,
encoding and frame structure, the authors transform the com-
munication security problem into a physical security. However,
this work assumes security performance in terms of bit error
rate.
C. Contributions
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) We propose a wiretap channel model for the finite-length
regime. The model includes an stochastic wiretap en-
coding method using existing practical error correcting
codes. Secrecy is provided with privacy amplification,
for which the finite-length secrecy metric is given that
upper bounds semantic secrecy.
2) We derive a novel RF (broadcast) satellite wiretap
channel model that parameterizes stochastic degrada-
tion in angular and radial coordinates for the realistic
assumption of rotational symmetry of antenna patterns.
The model allows to identify stochastic degraded spatial
areas on the broadcasting space region around the legit-
imate channel based on worst system-level assumptions
3) We propose a methodology for the design of a secure
satellite physical layer and finite-length performance
evaluation using existing hash codes and error correcting
codes. We define as sacrifice rate the fixed fraction of
the overall coding rate budget for reliability that needs to
be allocated to ensure secrecy. We illustrate our proposed
design method with numerical results using practical
error correcting codes in current standards of satellite
communication.
This work is structured as follows. Section II our proposed
wiretap channel model for the finite-length regime, wiretap
code construction method and secrecy metric. Section III
derives the satellite wiretap channel model for RF links and the
stochastically degraded spatial regions. Section IV presents the
application for the design of a secure satellite physical layer
and finite-length performance evaluation. A discussion for
realistic scenarios is presented in Section VI and conclusions
and further work are outlined in Section VII.
II. WIRETAP CHANNEL MODEL FOR FINITE-LENGTH
REGIME
A. Classic Wiretap Channel Model for the Infinite Regime
Shannon introduced the classic model of a cryptosystem
in 1949, where Eve has access to an identical copy of the
cyphertext that Alice sends to Bob. Shannon defined perfect
secrecy to be the case when the plaintext and the cyphertext
are statistically independent. Perfect secrecy is motivated by
error-free transmission and requires that Bob and Alice share
a secret key.
A. Wyner in 1975 [6] relaxed the stringent condition of
perfect statistical independency of Shannon’s cryptosystem
and introduced the wiretap channel model. In this model,
transmission is not error-free. The wiretap channel model is
composed of two channels. Consider the message set Mn =
{1, 2, ...,Mn}. The channel from the legitimate transmitter
(Alice) to the legitimate receiver (Bob) is referred to as
the "main” channel, and is considered to be a memoryless
channel characterized by input alphabet X, output alphabet
Y, a transition probability WY |X . The other channel from
Alice to a passive adversary (Eve) is referred to as the
"eavesdropper’s channel”, and consists of another memoryless
channel characterized by input alphabet X, output alphabet
Z, and transition probability WZ |X . Finite-length sequences
of the random variables X , Y , Z are denoted as Xn, Yn, Zn
and the corresponding sets Xn, Yn, Zn. This model supposes
that the statistics of both channels are known to all parties,
and that authentication is already done1. Also, it is assumed
that Eve knows the coding scheme used by Alice and Bob.
This probabilistic channel model is known as Type I and there
also exists a combinatorial channel model, which is known
as Type II [8]. It is given as an adversarial channel model,
where the intruder is allowed to observe µ ≤ n components
of the codeword. For either channel model, the classic wiretap
code design goal is the simultaneous provision of reliability
and security and requires stochastic encoders. In [6] Wyner
considered the special case where both the main and the eaves-
dropper channel are discrete memoryless channels (DMCs).
1A small secret key is needed to authenticate the communication. It is
known that log n bits of secret are sufficient to authenticate n bits of data [57]
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Further, under the assumption that the eavesdropper channel
is stochastically degraded with respect to the main channel,
he defined and obtained a unique parameter characterizing the
wiretap system, the secrecy capacity. This parameter means
that for  > 0, there exist coding schemes that can provide
secure and reliable rate (secrecy rate) Rs > Cs −  . Wyner
proved that Alice can send information to Bob in perfect
secrecy over a noisy channel without sharing a secret key
with Bob initially. I. Csiszár and J. Körner generalized in
Fig. 1. The wiretap channel model.
1978 [9] Wyner’s wiretap channel model by considering the
information-theoretic discrete memoryless broadcast channel
as shown in Fig. 1.The randomizer variable W is uniformly
distributed and is independent of M . The noisy broadcast
channel is characterized by the conditional distribution WYZ |X
so that Wyner’s model corresponds to the special case where
V → X → YZ is a Markov chain and PYZ |X factors
as WY |XWZ |X . The secrecy capacity Cs in this case is the
maximal rate at which Alice can reliably send information to
Bob such that the rate at which Eve obtains this information
is arbitrarily small. It is positive whenever the legitimate
channel has an advantage in terms of the broadcast channel’s
conditional distribution WYZ |X . In this case, the secrecy ca-
pacity of a discrete memoryless wiretap channel is completely
characterized as
Cs = max
pVX
(I(V ;Y ) − I(V ; Z))+ , (1)
where I(V ;Y ) and I(V ; Z) express the mutual informations
under the distributions pVXY := WY |XpXV and pVXZ :=
WZ |XpXV , and (a)+ is a for a positive number a and is 0
for a negative number a. The use of channel prefixing by
using additional V can be used in case I(X;Y ) ≤ I(X; Z)
for all input distributions [9] but also as a technique to
handle system-related cost constraints [47], in which case
the auxiliary channel pX |V is optimized so that the output
sequence satisfies some target cost.
B. Proposed Wiretap Channel Model for the Finite-length
Regime
The classic wiretap model as first proposed by Wyner
and then generalised by I. Csiszár and J. Körner was later
strengthended to meet cryptographic security standards in [10]
and more recently in [49][50]. In doing so, logical equiv-
alences are found between existing cryptographic security
measures and classic information theoretic security metrics.
The cryptographic approach to the wiretap channel can also
be framed within spectrum information-theoretic methods, as
established by Hayashi [52]. This is the approach we adopt
here where a stochastic process of encoding and decoding is
assumed using the privacy amplification method. Then, the
chosen secrecy metric meets cryptographic criteria and is given
in the finite length regime. Our proposed wiretap channel
model for the finite-length regime is given as follows.
1) Stochastic wiretap encoder: The stochastic wiretap en-
coder is based on the privacy amplification method REFS.
This method decouples reliability and secrecy, enabling the
implementation of different security protocols. The code uses
hash functions to approximate the statistical random process
Zn as induced by a uniform input distribution nearly identical
to a uniform pXn therefore not requiring uniform message
distribution as
qZn =
n∏
i=1
n∑
x∈X
WZ |X (z |x)qX (x). (2)
This model is shown in Fig. 2. Note that it is a particular
design of the wiretap model in Fig. 1.
Fig. 2. The wiretap channel model for Eve in this paper.
The practical construction of a wiretap code with this
method is as follows. We can make a wiretap code from
a conventional linear error correcting code. e.g., a capacity
achieving LDPC or Polar code, which has efficient encoding
and decoding at finite length. In this construction, assuming n
uses of the channel and a target of kn secure bits to be transmit-
ted, we need to sacrifice k ′n bits by attaching randomized hash
function F [57], [63]. That is, to transmit kn bits securely,
we need to employ a linear error correcting code that can
transmit kn + k ′n bits. Let’s denote the error correcting coding
rate at finite length as ρ(n, Bn ), where Bn is the reliability
guaranteed to Bob (measured as average error probability)
with finite coding size n. Let’s also denote the coding rate to
be sacrificed, the sacrificed rate, as ρsac(n, δEn ) = k ′n/n, where
δEn is the secrecy guaranteed against eavesdropping (measured
with secrecy metric introduced later) with finite coding size n.
Then, the secure coding rate, ρs , is limited by the sacrificed
rate as
ρs(n, Bn , δEn ) = ρ(n, Bn ) − ρsac(n, δEn ). (3)
2) Secrecy metric in the finite length regime: Several
metrics have been introduced in the wiretap literature to
relax the total independency required by Shannon perfect
secrecy. The metric introduced by Wyner in [6] was later
called weak secrecy and is given as the normalized mutual
information rate under the assumption of uniform distribution
pM [60][59]. The weak security metric criterion was strength-
ened to strong secrecy by subsequent improvement of Wyner’s
model in [48] and coincides with the mutual information also
with uniform distribution pM [58, Appendix D-C][61] and is
given as
Sstrong(M; Zn) = I(M; Zn) = D(pMZn ‖pM pZn ). (4)
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Since message M does not necessarily obey the uniform distri-
bution, in general, the information theoretic secrecy criterion
was formalized by Bellare, Tessaro, and Vardy [49], [50] by
adapting the notion of semantic secrecy used in computational
cryptography [51] while a similar criterion has been introduced
in the security analysis of quantum key distribution [67,
(7),(9)].
The secrecy metric used in this paper is an upper bound of
the semantic secrecy metric. Instead of a quantity that gives
the resulting semantic security we have an upper bound as
follows [27]
Sstrong(M; Zn) = D(pMZn ‖pM pZn )
=D(pMZn ‖pMqZn ) − D(pZn ‖qZn )
≤D(pMZn ‖pMqZn )
=E(D(pZn |M ‖qZn )|M)
Since inducing a uniform distribution obeys to
maxpM Sstrong(M; Zn), semantic secrecy can be guaranteed
by upper bounding the quantity maxpM Sstrong(M; Zn)
with a proper coefficient. Since the security criterion
maxpM Sstrong(M; Zn) expresses the strong security
independent of the source distribution PM , it is called
the source universal security [58, Section XIII]. Another
related measure is the effective secrecy in [47], which refers
to measures in [52, Section III].
When we employ the random coding for the reliability and
the resolvability for the secrecy, both metrics Bn and δ
E
n in
the finite-length (i.e. non-asymptotic) regime are exponential
functions. The analytical expression for the former has been
derived in [64] and for the latter has been derived in [52][58].
In this paper, we address a practical construction of wire-tap
code by using existing error correcting code and a randomized
hash function F [55]. While the detail construction is given in
Appendix A, the calculation complexity of its implementation
is not so large. When we employ this wire-tap code, assuming
WZ |X is symmetric, as explained in Appendix B, we can
evaluate our considered metric in the finite-length as the
average with respect to the hash function F. That is, it is
upper bounded as
EFSstrong(s |M; Zn) ≤ 1s 2
−sk′n enE0(s |WZ |X,pX,U ). (5)
for s ∈ [0, 1], where
E0(s |WZ |X, pX,U ) = E0,max(s |WZ |X )
= log
∫
(
∑
x∈{1,−1}
1
2
WZ |X (z |x) 11−s )1−sdz.
III. RF (BROADCAST) WIRETAP SATELLITE CHANNEL
MODEL
A. Channel model
We consider a typical satellite RF channel with 2m-level
phase shift keying (2m-PSK) modulation with additive white
Gaussian (AWGN) noise. We assume the realistic case of space
links with no fading. The complex low pass equivalent signal
is
Xi = exp
[
j
2pi (i − 1)
2m
]
, i = 1, . . . , 2m .
We assume the symbol duration, Ts , and unitary energy
constellation Es = E
[ |Xi |2] = 1.
For m = 1 we have the binary signal called BPSK. We can
represent the BPSK signal as two points located on a single
geometrical basis (orthonormal carrier) with one point located
at +
√
Eb and another point located at −
√
Eb with EbRb =
Eb/Tb , Tb is the bit period and Rb is the bit rate.
Fig. 3. Under the (realistic) assumption of rotational symmetry of the antenna
patterns, polar coordinates ρB , ρE , and θE (with θB = 0) in 2D capture the
3D scenario of spatial relative positions of Alice, Bob and Eve w.r.t. antenna
boresight.
Denote as hY (piB, λc) and hZ (piE, λc) the deterministic
coefficients that describe the (square root of) the power decay
due to propagation. Both coefficients can be functions of time
for moving Eve and Bob. Under the (realistic) assumption of
rotational symmetry of the antenna patterns, we can use polar
coordinates to represent the scenario such as piB = (ρB, θB)
and piE = (ρE, θE ) describe Bob’s and Eve’s polar coordinates.
Alice’s location is set as center of the wiretap satellite channel
coordinate system. Bob’s radial coordinate is ρB and Bob’s
angular coordinate is set as reference of the polar angles, i.e.
θB = 0 as shown in Fig. 3. λc is the transmission wavelength,
i.e. λc = c/ fc with c the speed of light.
For simplicity, we now assume unitary transmission power.
Therefore, the large-scale signal models of the received signals
after demodulation during a symbol interval are
Y = hY (piB, λc) X + NB;
Z = hZ (piE, λc) X + NE ;
(6)
The dependency of the propagation attenuation with the
wavelength is only due to how the system parameters are
measured for computing the free loss propagation. The terms
NB and NE are complex circular Gaussian random variables
with zero mean and noise energy per (complex) symbol at
Bob’s receiver n′B and n
′
E , respectively.
For the purpose of security analysis methodology, without
loss of generality it is sufficient to consider a simplified e.g.
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uplink budget between Alice and Bob as in Fig. 3. In this case,
the deterministic coefficient for Bob can be expressed as
hY (piB, λc) = √gA,maxgB,max 1
ρB
(
λc
4pi
)
, (7)
where gA,max and gB,max are the gains of Alice’s antenna
and Bob’s antennas to each other direction, so antennas are
aligned. We assume perfect polarization antenna matching
and we omit additional transmission/reception path losses and
(geo-climatic) atmospheric contributions as a first approxima-
tion. For reliable communication, the satellite system design
should ensure a minimal received power level at the legitimate
receiver so that the link budget is closed.
Let’s now introduce the parameter α (θE ) to account for
spatial attenuation due to Alice’s antenna radiation’s pattern
with respect to the Bob’s boresight angle. α (θE ) can be
considered exactly in case the antenna pattern is known, or
otherwise it can be considered in terms of the allowed emission
of radiation according to space regulations. Denote Eve’s
antenna gain as g(θE ) and introduce the parameter µ (θE ) to
account for the relative antenna gain between Bob and Eve,
i.e.
√
gE (θE ) = µ (θE ) √gB,max with
µmin ≤ µ (θE ) ≤ µmax . (8)
Note that we consider that Eve’s antenna can be either better
or worse than Bob’s. The angular dependency may be given
according to general assumptions on Eve but it can also be
dropped by assuming a worst case value for the scenario under
analysis, i.e. µmin ≤ µ ≤ µmax . We also define β (r, ρE ) to
account for relative propagation losses between Bob and Eve
as
β2 (r, ρE ) =
ρ2B
ρrE
. (9)
The exponent r accounts for the power attenuation decay
that affects Eve’s propagation channel. Different values of
the exponent model correspond to different assumptions about
Eve. Specifically, Eve can be modeled as a terrestrial, aerial
or satellite station. For example, while for the satellite case
r = 2, in case of aerial Eve, a good assumption is to consider
a large scale two-ray ground multipath model,with r > 2. It is
also known that for unmanned vehicles at low elevation, the
propagation law has strong dependency with height and this
can also be captured by r . Finally let’s define a coefficient γn
such that
γminn ≤ γn ≤ γmaxn (10)
to account for the relative performance of Eve’s w.r.t. Bob’s
receivers in terms of additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
power. Note that we consider that Eve’s receiver can be either
better or worse than Bob’s. With these parameters we can then
write
hZ (piE, λc) = hY (piB, λ)α (θE ) µ (θE ) β (r, ρE ) . (11)
Rewriting hY (piB, λc) X to X , we can simplify (6) as
Y = X +
√
nBX1;
Z = γgX +
√
γnnBX2;
(12)
with X1 and X2, zero-mean circular complex Gaussian random
variables with unit variance and the deterministic coefficient
γg is defined as
γg(θE, ρE, r) := α (θE ) µ (θE ) β (r, ρE ) . (13)
The model shows the two components of physical degradation:
geometrical captured by β (r, ρE ) and system-related captured
by α (θE ), which is controlled by Alice and µ (θE ), which
is controlled by Eve. Overall, the channel parameters are
summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF PARAMETERS IN RF SATELLITE WIRETAP CHANNEL MODEL
Parameter Explanation Eq. etc.
θE Angle between Bob and Eve. Fig. 3
ρB Distance to Bob. Fig. 3
ρE Distance to Eve. Fig. 3
nB Noise power level at Bob’s receiver. (38)
γg (θE, ρE, r)
Deterministic channel attenuation
(13)coefficient. It captures Eve’s channel
degradation w.r.t. Bob’s channel.
γn
Ratio between the noise power levels at (10)
EVe’s and Bob’s receivers. (38)
α(θB )
Spatial attenuation due to Alice’s antenna
(21)radiation pattern. It can be given as
antenna gain or allowed radiation mask.
µ(θE )
Eve’s antenna gain. For convenience is
(8)
taking as
√
gE (θE ) = µ (θE ) √gB,max
with µ(θE ) taking values between 0 and
1. For convenience, in this paper, we
assume µmin ≤ µ ≤ µmax .
β(r, ρE )
Coefficient relating Bob’s and Eve’s path
(9)losses. It considers Friis model for Boband Eve. For Eve, a power attenuation
decay of “r” instead of 2 is considered.
B. Stochastically degraded spatial regions
As discussed in Section II.A, the secrecy capacity of a
memoryless wiretap channel in the infinite-length regime is
completely characterized as (41), which is statistically de-
scribed by the conditional distribution WYZ |X . Further, under
the assumption that the eavesdropper channel is stochastically
degraded with respect to the main channel, the secrecy ca-
pacity is positive. Hence, without discussing the block-length
and the choice of error correcting code for the finite-length
construction in (3), the condition for positive secrecy capacity
is a necessary condition for positive secrecy rate.
We now use our RF wiretap satellite channel model to iden-
tify the stochastically degraded spatial regions. For this, recall
that [66] physically degraded and stochastically degraded
channels belong to the same equivalence class of broadcast
channels, having the same conditional marginals and hence
same capacity. Denote the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for Bob
as ηB = EsnB , the wiretap channel model for Eve describes all
space around the satellite channel in polar coordinates, hence
physical and stochastic degradation is given as
ηB >
γ2g(θE, ρE, r)
γn
ηB (14)
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yielding the following condition
γg(θE, ρE, r) < √γn. (15)
It is convenient to introduce the regularized parameter
γg,0(θE, ρE, r) :=
γg(θE, ρE, r)√
γn
, (16)
so that the condition (15) now is γg,0(θE, ρE, r) < 1 and the
regularized signal of Eve is written as
1√
γn
Z = γg,0X +
√
nBX2. (17)
As discussed in Appendix C, once the condition (15) is
satisfied, the secrecy capacity is given as a function of γg,0
and nB in the following way in the BPSK case.
Cs(γg,0, nB)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
8pinB
u
[
e
−(y+1)2
nB + e
−(y−1)2
nB
]
dy
−
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
8pinB
u
[
e
−(z+γg,0)2
nB + e
−(z−γg,0)2
nB
]
dz. (18)
where u(x) := −x log x. Then, we have a numerical calculation
of the secrecy capacity as a function of γg,0 and nB as Fig. 4.
Hence, it is important to characterize the regularized parameter
γg,0(θE, ρE, r) as a function of θE as well as ρE and r .
Fig. 4. Secrecy capacity given by (46) represented as a function of γg,0 in the
vertical axis and the signal-to-noise ratio Es/nB for Es = 1 in the horizontal
axis.
The stochastically degraded spatial regions for RF wiretap
satellite channel are then identified as
RRF
ηB
(ρE, r) =
{
θE |γg,0(θE, ρE, r) < 1
}
=
{
θE |γdBg (θE, ρE, r) − γdBn < 0
}
,
(19)
where superscript dB indicates values in decibels. Hence with
no assumption on Eve’s location we have
RRF
ηB
=
{RRF (ρE, r), ∀(ρE, r)} (20)
since it is possible to associate a propagation law depending
on Eve’s location.
Now, we provide some numerical examples. For the sake
of clarity, in order to reduce the number of variables we fix
the operation point as Es = nB = 1 and use the notation
RRF (ρE, r) and RRF . First, let’s assume the simple case of
Bob as a geostationary Earth orbit (GEO) satellite and study
the effect of low Earth orbit (LEO) and medium Earth orbit
(MEO). In this case it is realistic to assume γn = 1. As for
a (normalized) antenna pattern we can use some illustrative
pattern radiation diagram with side lobes such as [70]
α(θE ) = J1(k sin(θE ))2k sin(θE ) + 36
J3(k sin(θE ))
(k sin(θE ))3 (21)
where k = 2.0712/sin(θ3dBE ), with θ3dBE being the one-sided
half-power angular beamwidth and J1 and J3 are the Bessel
functions of the first kind, of order one and three respectively.
Note that in case the antenna pattern is not known, the analysis
can be made with α(θE ) considered in terms of the allowed
emission of radiation according to space regulations (see e.g.
Recommendation ITU-R S.465-6). We assume radial distances
of 15000 km and 1200 km as illustrative of the visibility
windows for MEO and LEO satellite orbits, respectively.
Fig. 5 and 6 shows the angle from which the channel is
degraded. We observe that when Eve uses a LEO satellite,
Eve’s channel is degraded w.r.t. Bob’s channel if Eve and
Bob have an angular separation greater than 7◦(15◦) in case
of equally good antennas and greater than 10◦(20◦) if Eve’s
antenna is 6 dB better than Bob’s antenna for 3 dB angle of
5◦(10◦). We observe that degradation region is smaller for
MEO than for LEO. This is due to the dependency of the
degradation condition with the ratio β(r, ρE ), namely, for fixed
ρB the smaller β(r, ρE ) the more degraded is the channel, and
clearly the ratio β(r, ρE ) is smaller for MEO orbit than for
LEO orbit. We also observe as expected that if the antenna
directivity increases, the degraded region is also increased,
and the increase is larger when Eve’s antenna is not better.
The above cases are illustrative, but due to the relative
Fig. 5. Angles defining stochastically degraded regions, RRF (ρE, r), when
Bob is a GEO satellite and Eve uses LEO and MEO satellites for θ3dBE = 5
◦
with γdBn = 0.
movement, there is limited time window for eavesdropping.
Hence, we assume now the case of Bob at e.g. MEO orbit and
study the degraded spatial region in the challenging scenario
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Fig. 6. Angles defining stochastically degraded regions, RRF (ρE, r), when
Bob is a GEO satellite and Eve uses LEO and MEO satellites for θ3dBE = 10
◦
with γdBn = 0.
where Eve uses Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). We note
that propagation channel modelling for this scenario is still
a research area. Moreover, there is a wide variety of UAVs
that can be used by Eve depending on the scenario under
analysis. For illustration we simply assume different heights
with higher path loss exponent for lower heights (see e.g. [71]).
Fig. 7 shows three different heights assuming µ = −25 dB and
γn = 3 (4.77 dB). We observe in this example scenario that
when Eve uses a UAV, Eve’s channel is degraded w.r.t. Bob’s
channel if Eve and Bob have an angular separation greater
than 12◦ and 18◦ for radial distances of 5 km and 10 km,
respectively. However, for low altitude and propagation law
r = 3, Eve’s channel is never degraded. Such low altitude
UAVs however may not be the best choice for Eve as it can
be visually detected. All numerical values are presented in
Table II.
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF PARAMETERS IN NUMERICAL ANALYSIS.
ρE θ3dBE r
µ
γn
Degradation
(km) (dB) condition
Fig. 7 (t) 5 1(0) 0
MEO 15000 2 θE > 13◦
LEO 1200 2 θE > 7◦
Fig. 7 (b) 5 2(6) 0
MEO 15000 2 θE > 18◦
LEO 1200 2 θE > 10◦
Fig. 8 (t) 10 2(6) 0
MEO 15000 2 θE > 26◦
LEO 1200 2 θE > 15◦
Fig. 8 (b) 10 2(6) 0
MEO 15000 2 θE > 28◦
LEO 1200 2 θE > 20◦
Fig. 9 5 0.05(-25) 3
UAV low 1 3 -
UAV medium 5 2 θE > 18◦
UAV high 10 2 θE > 12◦
(t) expresses the top and (b) expresses the bottom.
Fig. 7. Angular regions where security can be guaranteed for Bob on a MEO
orbit and Eve on different types of UAVs. It shows three different heights
assuming µ = −25 dB and γn = 3 (4.77 dB)
IV. APPLICATION TO THE DESIGN OF A SECURE PHYSICAL
LAYER SATELLITE LINK
In this section we show the practical application of the
secure wiretap code construction method (3) and degradation
regions (19) for the design of secure physical layer for realistic
satellite channels. In order to show the application, we employ
existing practical error correcting codes with hashing. A hash
construction is explained in [72]. We assume the discrete
binary input Gaussian output (BI-AWGN) channel in the
finite-length regime. Hence, we choose LDPC codes using
BPSK in current satellite communication standards. Namely,
we consider the LDPC code for low SNR and BPSK from
DVB-S2 [74] with ρLDPC = 1/3 and medium and short frame
coded block size, which are nmed = 32400 and nshort = 16200
bits, respectively. Note that we restrict our error correction and
the hash functions to linear operations.
As a realistic design scenario, we tackle the case where the
sacrifice rate is the design constraint i.e., for a given error cor-
recting code length n, the designer fixes a fraction of the total
coding rate budget for reliability to be traded off with secrecy.
Now, note that from a coding point of view it is of interest
to evaluate the trade-off between the amount of information
leakage given by the secrecy metric (22) and the sacrifice rate
design constraint, i.e. ρsac = xρLDPC, with x the fixed allocated
budget to security so that ρs(n, Bn , δEn ) = (1 − x)ρLDPC(n, Bn ).
This tradeoff is illustrated in Fig. 8 where the security metric
is shown for the two LDPC codes. We consider for clarity the
secrecy metric (36) expressed exponentially as
EFSstrong(s |M; Zn) ≤ 2−nE[ρsac], (22)
with
E[ρsac] = min
s∈[0,1]
[
sρsac +
log(s)
n
− E0,max(s |WZ |X ) log2(e)
]
.
(23)
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For example, when xρLDPC = 0.18, the information leakage
is lower than 10−5 for both the medium and the short frames.
Higher fraction x will provide higher protection.
Fig. 8. Secrecy metric as a function of the sacrifice rate (zoom in at ρsac =
0.18). The evaluation is for γg,0 = 0.5.
However, note that such tradeoff assumes a fixed (polar)
angle coordinate in space for Eve for the evaluation of
E0,max(s |WZ |X ) (which corresponds to some degradation for
the regularized parameter γg,0, in Fig. 8 such degradation is
γg,0 = 0.5). In other words, this tradeoff assumes that the
designer of the secure communication system has channel side
information (CSI) and system side information (SSI) of the
eavesdropper. Hence, this view is not useful from a practical
design point of view since the secure system design needs
to provide security guarantees in all space between Eve and
Bob. Hence, it is meaningful to evaluate how the information
leakage occurs in the spatial regions of the channel degradation
for a given choice of sacrifice rate. This leakage is what
the secure communication designer needs to guarantee to the
user of the secure system. It is however unavoidable to make
assumptions about Eve’s system noise receiver, parameterized
by γn. Clearly, a reasonable design decision is to make a
worst case system assumption (WSSI) on Eve’s noise power.
Therefore, for a given code length n, we fix a sacrifice rate,
ρ∗sac = xρLDPC, to be assessed and write (22) as a function of
the polar angle coordinate within the degraded channel region.
For this, using the relation (13) for γg, we do the following
translation from secure information theoretical notation to
secure communication system notation of our secrecy metric
δEn (s |θR) = EFSstrong(s |M; Zn), θR ∈ RRFηB (ρE, r).
Observe that the notation now makes explicit the dependency
of the security metric with physical system resources (through
ηB and n) and spatial degradation area (through ρE and θR).
Therefore we can write the exponential decay for the fixed
sacrifice rate ρ∗sac as,
δEn (s |θR) ≤ 2−nE[θR ], θR ∈ RRFηB (ρE, r). (24)
with
E[θR] = min
s∈[0,1]
[
sρ∗sac +
log(s)
n
− E0,max(s |θR) log2(e)
]
. (25)
For example, for the same region RRFLEO = {θE |θE > 15◦}
and design target ρ∗sac = 0.18, Fig. 9 shows the leakage
decay in the angular coordinate for both nmed = 32400 and
nshort = 16200 bits. The secrecy metric shows exponential
decay in the stochastically degraded area. As expected, observe
that stochastic degradation provides a conservative design
since information leakage is already practically zero slightly
below θE = 15◦.
Fig. 9. Secrecy metric as a function of the polar angle coordinate within the
degraded channel region RRF
LEO
= {θE |θE > 15◦ } (for which Es = nB = 1
and γn = 1) for design target ρ∗sac = 0.18.
Note that this is still a conservative approach to secure
physical layer design since we evaluate the region of positive
capacity (instead of the region of positive secrecy rate).
However, it allows a good understanding of the problem of
realistic design of a secure physical layer. This will allow to
proceed further with more difficult scenarios.
Also note that while the above example is only for LEO
orbit, it is straightforward to obtain the secrecy guarantees in
all points of the degraded space between Bob and Eve for any
possible stochastic degradation region. As an example, Fig. 10
shows the values for a range of locations in radial coordinate.
It is observed that there is no secrecy guarantee outside the
degraded channel region, which is visualized as values of the
secrecy metric greater than one and the effect of the antenna
still present.
Finally, note that mission-specific services may prioritize
reliability over secrecy or vice versa. Also note that for certain
mission-specific air interfaces, the finite-length regime needs
to be analyzed considering both the link and the physical layer
framing. This is due to the fact that some air interface may
define very short link layer frames and/or significant physical
layer overhead. In such cases, the air interface overhead could
be comparable to the coding overhead.
V. REALISTIC SCENARIO
Finally, we discuss how we can guarantee the security in a
realistic situation. We have seen that the security parameters
for transmitted message are upper bounded in (36). The upper
bound given in (36) depends only on the parameter γg,0 due to
the relation (17). To guarantee the security level, we need to
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Fig. 10. Secrecy metric in a range of polar and radial coordinates within
the degraded channel region RRF with Es = nB = 1 for design target
ρ∗sac = 0.18.
check whether the parameter γg,0 belongs to a certain region.
Dependently of the values of γg,0 and the sacrifice rate ρsac,
Fig. 8 guarantees the security level when γg,0 takes the value
0.5. The numerical analysis in Section III.B clarifies when
the degradation condition γg,0 < 1 holds dependently of θE
with proper other parameters. Therefore, we need to check
whether the device by Eve does not exist within the angle θE
given in Table III. If this condition can be adopted, we can
guarantee the security information theoretically. If we cannot
deny a possibility that Eve has a stealth device, we need to
use more powerful satellite communication, e.g., quantum key
distribution [68] and two-way scenario [69].
However, when Eve has to eavesdrop so many satellite
communications, it is quite difficult for Eve to prepare such
a receiver for all of satellite communications. In this case,
Eve needs to prepare many stealth devices, which require
much higher cost for Eve. This is a serious difference from
the computational security because one powerful computer
can recode the encrypted message. Further, only a limited
numbers of users can prepare such stealth device. When we
consider the cost-effectiveness, our assumption is reasonable
for conventional user due to the finiteness of Eve’s budget.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have proposed the necessary models
and metrics to develop a methodology for the design of a
secure satellite physical layer and finite-length performance
evaluation. Our proposed method makes use of existing hash
codes and error correcting codes and is based on defining the
fixed fraction of the overall coding rate budget for reliability
that needs to be allocated to ensure secrecy, sacrifice rate. We
illustrate our proposed design method with numerical results
using practical error correcting codes in current standards of
satellite communication. Our methodology does not make use
of channel side information of the eavesdropper, only assumes
worst case system assumptions. It allows to identify guaran-
teed secrecy and also where secure communication cannot be
achieved, which in the satellite case corresponds to the case
where the eavesdropper is situated physically near the antenna
transmitter, in which case, we have provided a discussion for
other security alternatives. As further work, the method can
be applied to different satellite channels and different power
constraints for which average performance can be obtained in
the case of considering short term stochastic fading at different
frequencies. Losses due to different atmospheric phenomena
can be easily incorporated to fully characterise the secrecy
and communication performance and corresponding tradeoff
for the given channel code under consideration.
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APPENDIX A
WIRETAP CODE CONSTRUCTION
A. General construction
Now, we discuss how to make a wiretap channel code to
realize the security. First, we prepare an auxiliary random
variable Ln subject to the uniform distribution on another set
Ln. Then, we prepare an error correcting code. That is, we
prepare an encoder as a map φe,n from the set Mn × Ln to
the input alphabet Xn, and a decoder as a map φd,n from the
input alphabet Xn to the set Mn × Ln.
We also prepare another map fn from Mn × Ln to Mn
satisfying the condition
| f −1n (m)| = |Ln | (26)
for m ∈ Mn. This map is often called a hash function. The
encoder of our wiretap code is given as follows. When Alice
intends to send a message m, using the auxiliary random
variable Ln, she generates a random variable L ′n on f −1n (m)
because the cardinality of f −1n (m) is the same as that of Ln.
Then, she sends the alphabet φe,n(L ′n). The decoder is given
as the map fn ◦ φd,n.
When X has a modular structure and the channels WY |X
and WZ |X satisfy covariant properties, the channel is called
symmetric. Now, we consider the special symmetric case when
X = {0, 1} = F2.
Now, we employ an algebraic error correcting code for
the case with X = F2. That is, the map φe,n is given as a
homomorphism from the set Mn × Ln to the input alphabet
Xn = Fn2 , where Mn and Ln are given as Fkn2 and F
k′n
2 , and
the map fn fromMn×Ln toMn is given as an isomorphism.
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Such an algebraic code is given as a pair of two sublinear
spaces C2 ⊂ C1 ⊂ Fn2 , where C1 and C2 are isomorphic to
F
kn+k
′
n
2 and F
k′n
2 , respectively. So, the map φe,n is given as the
isomorphism from Fkn+k
′
n
2 to C1. Using the isomorphic from
the quotient space C1/C2 to Fkn2 , we define the map fn fromMn×Ln toMn. This type of encoder is called coset encoding.
B. Randomized construction
In this section, we fix an algebraic error correcting code
(φe,n, φd,n). Here, we choose integers kn and k ′n such that kn+
k ′n is the message length of the given algebraic error correcting
code (φe,n, φd,n) and kn is the message length of our secrecy
transmission. So, k ′n can be regarded as the sacrifice bit-length
in our protocol. Then, we consider a randomized hash function
F : Fkn+k
′
n
2 → Fkn2 satisfying the following property:
∀m , ∀m′ ∈ Fkn+k′n2 P (F(m) = F(m′)) ≤
1
2kn
. (27)
This condition is called universal2 [57], and will be supposed
in the remaining part. A modified form of the Toeplitz matrices
is also shown to be universal2, which is given by a concatena-
tion (T(S), I) of the k ′n×kn Toeplitz matrix T(S) and the kn×kn
identity matrix I [55], where S is the random seed to decide
the Toeplitz matrix and belongs to Fkn+k
′
n−1
2 . The (modified)
Toeplitz matrices are particularly useful in practice, because
there exists an efficient multiplication algorithm using the fast
Fourier transform algorithm with complexity O(n log n).
When the random seed S is fixed, the encoder for our
wiretap code is given as follows. By using the auxiliary
random variable Ln ∈ Fk
′
n
2 , the wiretap encoder is given as
φe,n
(( I −T(S)
0 I
) ( M
Ln
))
because (I,T(S))
( I −T(S)
0 I
)
=
(I, 0). (Toeplitz matrix T(S) can be constructed as a part of
circulant matrix. For example, the reference [63, Appendix
C] gives a method to give a circulant matrix.). More efficient
construction for universal2 hash function is discussed in [63].
So, the wiretap decoder is given as Yn 7→ (I,T(S))φd,n(Yn).
When φd,n can be efficiently performed like a LDPC code or
a Polar code, That is, as long as the algebraic error correcting
code (φe,n, φd,n) can be efficiently performed our code can be
efficiently performed.
APPENDIX B
SECRECY EXPONENT FUNCTION
Using the channel to eavesdropper described by a transition
matrix WZ |X , we define the function
ψ(s |WZ |X, qX )
:= log
∑
x,z
qX (x)WZ |X (z |x)1+s(
∑
x
qX (x)WZ |X (z |x))−s . (28)
This function satisfies
ψ(s |WZ |X, qX )
s
→ I(X; Z) (29)
as s→ 0.
Firstly, for simplicity, we consider the case when the main
channel WY |X is noiseless and the channel to the eaves dropper
is given as the n-fold extension of WZ |X . In this case, the error
correcting encoder φe,n is the identity map and kn + k ′n = n.
Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The above given code satisfies
EFSstrong(M; Zn) ≤ 1s 2
−sk′n enψ(s |WZ |X,pX,U ) (30)
for s ∈ [0, 1], where pX,U is the uniform distribution.
This theorem can be shown as a special case of [55, (12)]. So,
when
ψ(s |WZ |X, pX,U )
s
<
kn
n
log 2, (31)
the average of the leaked information EFSstrong(Mn; Zn) goes
to zero exponentially.
Now, we proceed to the general case, i.e., the case when the
main channel WY |X is noisy. So, the error correcting encoder
φe,n is not the identity map, and kn + k ′n is smaller than n. To
discuss the general case, we introduce other functions
E0(s |WZ |X, qX ) := log
∑
z
(
∑
x
qX (x)WZ |X (z |x) 11−s )1−s (32)
E0,max(s |WZ |X ) :=max
qX
E0(s |WZ |X, qX ). (33)
This function satisfies
E0(s |WZ |X, qX )
s
→ I(X; Z) (34)
as s → 0. Further, we have the following theorem [56,
Theorem 7].
Theorem 2: The above given code satisfies
EFSstrong(M; Zn) ≤ 1s 2
−sk′n enE0,max(s |WZ |X ). (35)
for s ∈ [0, 1].
Additionally, when WZ |X is symmetric, the convexity of the
map qX 7→ eE0(s |WZ |X,qX ) [55, Lemma 1] and the symmetry
yield the following theorem.
Theorem 3: When WZ |X is symmetric, E0,max(s |WZ |X )
equals E0(s |WZ |X, pX,U ). That is, the maximum is achieved
by the uniform distribution pX,U for X .
Hence, we have [55, (21)].
EFSstrong(M; Zn) ≤ 1s 2
−sk′n enE0(s |WZ |X,pX,U ). (36)
for s ∈ [0, 1].
So, when E0,max(s |WZ |X )s is smaller than ( k
′
n
n ) log 2, the av-
erage of the leaked information EFSstrong(M; Zn) goes to
zero exponentially. Since this method can be applied to any
algebraic error correcting code, our method can be applied to
the case when the code (φe,n, φd,n) is a LDPC code or a Polar
code. So, our method provides an efficient wiretap code based
on LDPC codes and Polar codes, which attains the wiretap
capacity for symmetric channel because the maximum in (33)
is attained when qX is the uniform distribution.
Further, even when the auxiliary random number Ln is not
uniform, a similar evaluation is available by slightly different
coding given in [58, Section XI]. Then, the above security
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evaluation holds with the replacement of 2−sk′n by esH1+s (Ln),
where H1+s(X) is the Rényi entropy defined as
H1+s(X) := −1s log
∑
x
PX (x)1+s . (37)
These evaluations still hold even when the output system of
WZ |X is continuous, e.g., the AWGN channel [58, Appendix
D]. In particular, the AWGN channel with binary input can be
regarded as a symmetric channel.
APPENDIX C
SECRECY CAPACITY OF RF GAUSSIAN CHANNEL
In this section, using a certain regularized parameter γg,0
defined in (16) of the main body, we derive the secrecy ca-
pacity with the BPSK scheme when Bob’s and Eve’s observed
signals are given as
Y = X +
√
nBX1;
Z = γg,0X +
√
nBX2;
(38)
with X1 and X2, zero-mean circular complex Gaussian random
variables with unit variance, nB is the noise power level at
Bob’s receiver. The independent Eve’s and Bob’s channels are
discrete input and continuous AWGN output channels. The
input random variable X takes 2m-PSK modulation vales as
X :=
{
exp
[
j 2pi(i−1)2m
]
, i = 1, . . . , 2m
}
.
The mutual information for Bob’s channel is
I(X;Y ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∑
x∈X
WY |X (y |x) qX (x) log2
WY |X (y |x)
WY (y) dy
where
WY (y) :=
∑
x
WY |X (y |x) qX (x) .
The mutual information for Eve’s channel is
I(X; Z) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∑
x∈X
WZ |X (z |x)qX (x) log2
WZ |X (z |x)
WZ (z) dz
where
WZ (z) :=
∑
x
WZ |X (z |x)qX (x).
Since the channels WZ |X and WY |X are Gaussian channels
and their difference is only the power of their noise, secure
communication is possible if and only if the channel WZ |X
is given as a degraded channel of WY |X , i.e., there exists a
channel WZ |Y such that
WZ |X (z |x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
WZ |Y (z |y)WY |X (y |x)dy. (39)
This condition is equivalent to the the following spatial
stochastic degradation condition for the constant coefficient
γg,0;
γg,0 < 1, (40)
which is addressed in Section III-B of the main body.
Using this property, we can simplify the capacity formula
Cs = max
pVX
(I(V ;Y ) − I(V ; Z))+ . (41)
In the formula (41), we have the Markov chain V − X −Y − Z ,
which implies that
I(V ;Y ) − I(V ; Z) = I(V ;YZ) − I(V ; Z)
=I(V ;Y |Z) ≤ I(X;Y |Z) = I(X;Y ) − I(X; Z). (42)
Here, the conditional mutual information I(X;Y |Z) is given
as
I(X;Y |Z) =
∫ ∞
−∞
∑
x∈X
WZ |Y (z |y)WY |X (y |x)qX (x)
· log2
WY |ZX (y |z, x)
WY |Z (y |z) dzdy,
where
WY |ZX (y |z, x) := WZ |Y (z |y)WY |Z (y |z)/WZ |x(z |x)
WY |Z (y |z) := WZ |Y (z |y)WY (y)/WZ (z).
Hence, the capacity given in (41) is simplified as
Cs = max
qX
(I(X;Y ) − I(X; Z))+ = max
qX
(I(X;Y |Z))+ . (43)
To express the dependence with respect to qX , we denote
the conditional mutual information by I(X;Y |Z)qX . Notice that
the mutual information I(X;Y |Z)qX is concave for qX . Let
g be the rotation in X by the multiplication of exp [ j 2pi2m ] .
For a distribution qX , we define the distribution g(qX ) as
g(qX )(x) := qX (g(x)). Since I(X;Y |Z)g(qX ) = I(X;Y |Z)qX ,
the mutual information I(X;Y |Z)qX is upper bounded by the
mutual information I(X;Y |Z)pX,U with the uniform distribu-
tion pX,U as
I(X;Y |Z)qX =
2m−1∑
i=0
2−mI(X;Y |Z)gi (qX )
≤I(X;Y |Z)∑2m−1
i=0 2−mgi (qX ) = I(X;Y |Z)pX,U . (44)
The final equation follows from the fact that the distribution∑2m−1
i=0 2−mgi(qX ) is the cyclic mixture of qX on X, which
equals the uniform distribution pX,U on X. In this case, the
maximization in (43) is achieved by the uniform distribution
due to the symmetry. That is,
Cs = I(X;Y |Z)pX,U . (45)
In general, the bit error probability of 2m-PSK is difficult
to obtain for an arbitrary integer m. We assume from now
m = 1 so that X takes values in {−1, 1}, which is called BPSK
modulation. Denoting as h(X) the differential entropy of a
random variable X , the secrecy capacity for BPSK input can
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be computed as the function of γg,0 and nB in the following
way;
Cs(γg,0, nB)
=I(X;Y ) − I(X; Z)
=h(X) − h(X |Y ) − h(X) + h(X |Z)
=h(X |Z) − h(X |Y )
=h(X) − h(Z) + h(Z |X) − [h(X) − h(Y ) + h(Y |X)]
= − h(Y |X) + h(Y ) − [−h(Z |X) + h(Z)]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1/2√
2pinB
u
[
e
−(y+1)2
nB + e
−(y−1)2
nB
]
dy +
1
2
log(2pienB)
−
∫ ∞
−∞
1/2√
2pinB
u
[
e
−(z+γg,0)2
nB + e
−(z−γg,0)2
nB
]
dz − 1
2
log(2pienB)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
8pinB
u
[
e
−(y+1)2
nB + e
−(y−1)2
nB
]
dy
−
∫ ∞
−∞
1√
8pinB
u
[
e
−(z+γg,0)2
nB + e
−(z−γg,0)2
nB
]
dz. (46)
where u(x) := −x log x. Therefore, we obtain the formula (18)
of the main body for the secrecy capacity.
This secrecy capacity is asymptotically achievable by the
wiretap code given in Section A-B. The infinite-length con-
dition of reliability holds since our proposed coding can be
applied to any algebraic error correcting code. Therefore, the
code (φe,n, φd,n) can be a LDPC code or a Polar code, which
are capacity achieving for this symmetric channel and hence
asymptotically attain the wiretap secrecy capacity because the
maximum in (43) is attained when qX is the uniform distribu-
tion. The infinite-length condition of secrecy also holds as
explained in Section B, since condition (40) is not constrained
by the underlying modulation and detection methods, i.e.
when we randomly choose F, the quantity Sstrong(M; Zn) is
sufficiently small with high probability.
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